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center. If we could overcome the problem of "cheap talk," we could make binding agreements that would make us all better off. We can overcome the problem of cheap talk if we believe that other people will reciprocate our cooperation. If we believe that other people act according to ethical principles or are generally trustworthy, we are more likely to cooperate ourselves (Hardin, 1992) . Our confidence in others depends how we expect them to behave, which we learn from experience (Gauthier, 1986, 156; Hardin, 1992) . Former President Ronald Reagan was fond of using an old Soviet expression on detente: "Trust but verify."
The second argument acknowledges that experience matters. But ethical commitment is not exclusively, or even fundamentally, a cumulation of life experiences. Instead, we resolve all manner of collective action problems through our values. Values are a collection of beliefs (generally linked together in an internally consistent framework) that provide guidelines for conducting one's life and relations with other people. And these ideals are not based on experience, but more general maxims.
1 Our values lead us to behave morally even when we might be better off looking out for ourselves.
Such beliefs are not contingent. The Ninth Commandment does not say, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor unless (s)he defects first." 2 As James Q. Wilson (1993, 231) argues: "We are faithful both because we wish others to accept our word and because we consider dishonesty and infidelity to be signs of wickedness." And Hume (1960, 518 ) made a similar claim: "If we thought, that promises had no moral obligation, we never shou'd feel any inclination to observe them."
The social capital approach stresses our obligations to others beyond considerations of self-interest. Social capital is a wide ranging set of ideas about values, social connections, and 5 civic engagement. Coleman (1990, 300) , following Loury (1977) , argues: "...social capital is the set of resources that inhere in family relations and in community social organizations and that are useful in for the cognitive or social development of a child." The core values that people hold are a central component of social capital (cf. Putnam, 1993, 169) . These values and social relations help people overcome collective action problems. People who have faith in others and strong ties to their communities will abjure self-interest and act for the common good-doing things such as joining civic associations, giving to charity, or simply telling the truth. Social capital research has focused on how people get involved in their communities-by joining voluntary organizations (Putnam, 1995) or by activities that take more time and/or commitment-such as volunteering, giving to charity, working on community problems, and being willing to serve on a jury. Yet, engagement in our communities means more than this. At a fundamental level, our commitment to others begins with how we treat others in daily life-as we see in such moral dictates as the Golden Rule and Kant's "categorical imperative." How we treat others in matters of everyday life is no less a collective action problem.
Alexis de Tocqueville (1945, 122) , the French visitor to the United States in the early 19 th century, found Americans more willing to help other people than Europeans. They overcame collective action problems by what he called "self-interest rightly understood," an "enlightened regard" that leads people to "willingly sacrifice a portion of their time and property to the welfare of the state." "Self-interest rightly understood" has become the foundation for contemporary theories of social capital (cf. Putnam, 1993) . This "enlightened regard" for others underlying social capital helps people resolve a wide range of collective action problems-from banding together on the frontier to help build homes (Tocqueville) , to leading people to join civic 6 organizations (Putnam, 1993 (Putnam, , 1995 , to fostering good deeds such as charitable contributions and volunteering time (Uslaner, 1997) .
Which values underlie social capital? Two are central: trust in other people and religious beliefs. Trust, Putnam (1993, 89, 169, 172) argues, is fundamental to social capital. Mutual trust establishes grounds for reciprocity: If you behave well, so will I. When people trust each other, they surmount the problem of "cheap talk." Trust reduces transaction costs-you don't spend a lot of resources monitoring the behavior of people you trust. Yet, how do we know when we can trust people? Most of the time we can't. It makes little sense to trust people we don't know.
Yet we know relatively few people personally (and even fewer well) even while we are called on to place our trust in a great many people (Hardin, 1992) . Can trust resolve collective action problems?
No-if we think of trust primarily as an encapsulation of our life experiences. Then we'll only trust some of the people we know. Yet, if we take a wider view of trust-as a moral value (cf. Mansbridge, in press; Uslaner, in press a; and Wuthnow, 1997)-then we can understand its role as the basis of "self-interest rightly understood." When we say that "most people can be trusted" (as opposed to "you can't be too careful in dealing with people," according to the standard survey question), we are expressing a generalized faith in other people.
Generalized trust reflects our belief that others will not act contrary to our interests-and that we need not expend scare resources monitoring their behavior to ensure such compliance (Dasgupta, 1988, 51) . But trust as a moral value makes a much stronger claim on us. It reflects a disposition to believe that others share our values and won't act against our interests even when they have the opportunity to do so-and even when they might not share our specific interests 7 (Fukayama, 1995, 26, 153) . As Silver (1989, 277) argues: "The act of trust extends commitment beyond extrapolated experience, by resolving uncertainties about others in the direction of unconditional confidence in their essential qualities and enduring dispositions."
The second component of social capital is religious values. Tocqueville (1945, 126-127) saw religion as the key force in helping Americans look beyond their immediate self-interest.
Hillel asked, "If I am for myself alone, what am I?" while Jesus held that we should "turn the other cheek" against transgressors. For virtually all faiths, one's obligations go beyond promises to other citizens. They extend to an overarching power. People with faith have "something within," a spiritual commitment that religious values should shape behavior in the secular world (Harris, 1994) . People who attend religious services regularly place a higher value on helping others and on honesty (Rokeach, 1973, 128. 133) . 3 Religious values and involvement with institutions of faith promote participation in other arenas: charitable contributions (Hodgkinson et al., 1996) , voting (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1992, 273) , and volunteering (Hodgkinson et al., 1996; Wuthnow, 1991, 199-200) . Religious people should thus be more likely than the secular to endorse strong standards of moral behavior.
This account holds that resolution of collective action problems depends primarily upon the core values of trust in others and religious ideals. Social connections also matter (see below), but it is important to distinction between values and networks (Newton, 1997 (Uslaner, 1997) . This general pattern, if it holds here as well, would suggest that social trust can help resolve collective action problems when divisions in a society are most severe.
The impact of both religious values and trust should be strongest when the stakes are highest. If you don't pay your fare on the subway, you don't gain much and the government doesn't lose much. But if you hit someone's car and don't file a report, you can save a lot on your own insurance; the owner of the other car will likely have a hefty bill (at least a substantial deductible) to make the repairs.
What holds for values also ought to apply for experience. Expectations of others' morality should have their greatest impacts when society is most divided and when the stakes are highest.
When society is split over a standard of behavior, it doesn't make sense (from a strictly utilitarian 9 point of view) to agree to do the "right thing" if you believe that others won't follow your lead.
When the stakes are great, you might be more reluctant to select the "moral" option if you are unsure that others will behave similarly. As with trust and religious values, the impacts for expectations of morality should depend on the level of consensus and how great the stakes are.
Values don't emerge in a vacuum, the social capital approach stresses. The other part of social capital is the social network, or "social connectedness." 4 Social ties create the sense of community that reinforce values promoting cooperation. Something as simple as being married or belonging to a union helps connect people to their neighborhoods and the broader communities.
As Putnam (1993, 90) argues, "...a dense network of secondary associations both embodies and contributes to effective social collaboration." And ties to one's community create moral obligations (Putnam, 1993, 111, The WVS has a good set of questions tapping our conceptions of morality and, more critically, it permits a direct test of how important expectations of other people's morality are.
The survey asked whether a series of behaviors could ever be justified. The acts, listed in order of their acceptability, are: (1) keeping money that you have found; (2) failing to report damage you've accidentally done to a parked car; (3) lying in your own interest; (4) cheating on taxes "if you have the chance"; (5) avoiding a fare on public transportation; (6) claiming government benefits you are not entitled to; (7) buying something you know was stolen; and (8) joyriding. The WVS did not inquire about whether people actually performed any of the acts. This problem is not severe, since people might be more truthful about evaluating prospective behavior than in admitting any actual misdeeds.
Respondents rated each item on a ten point scale, with one indicating that the activity is never justified and ten always justified. I present the means in Table 1 . Only keeping money that you find is considered acceptable by many people. It is the only moral behavior that received fewer than 50 percent "never justified" ratings. Only 32.6 percent of Americans ranked keeping money at one. Only 57 percent scored it at four or less--compared to 80 percent or more for all of the other questions. Joyriding was the least acceptable act: Ninety percent said that one should never consider it. This provides a direct test of an alternative to the social capital approach, which holds that we predicate our intentions to behave "morally" based upon our expectations of others. If we believe that other people have strong moral standards, it is less risky for us to join with them in forsaking any temptations to exploit others. Now, I cannot take into account all possible reasons why people may claim to have strong moral standards. People may behave morally (or claim to do so) because they fear fear being caught and punished. I have no way of testing this, since no questions on detection or punishment were included in the World Values Survey. However, this omission is not damning. The fear or getting caught and being punished play very limited roles in people's decisions to pay taxes and obey the law more generally (see Tyler, 1990 ; and the studies in Slemrod, 1992) . People may also adhere to strong moral standards for instrumental reasons: I may not want to joyride because I don't know how to pick the locks on cars and I may not want to avoid fares on public transportation because I don't like to jump over subway turnstiles. However, these are rather idiosyncratic rationales for moral behavior and they should vanish in large surveys, especially when I control for other factors. (3) thou shalt not commit adultery; (4) thou shalt not steal; (5) thou shalt not bear false witness against a neighbor; (6) thou shalt not covet a neighbor's wife; and (7) thou shalt not covet a neighbor's goods. Respondents rated themselves and others on a three-point scale, with one indicating that the commandment fully applies, two that it applies to a limited extent, and three that it doesn't apply at all.
The questions on the Ten Commandments are distinct from those on moral behavior. The latter ask us which types of behavior are acceptable: How wrong is it, for example, to lie? The former ask us to judge ourselves and others as ethical people: Do we lie (bear false witness)? It is difficult to separate the causal chain from moral behavior to perceptions of one's own (and others') good deeds. But certainly the argument from experience places heavy emphasis on what people do rather than what they say. A smooth-talking con artist with a big smile can (and may be more 13 likely to) bilk you more easily than someone with a sneer on his face. I present means and standard deviations for how people rank themselves and others in Table 2. ________________ Table 2 about here People rate themselves very highly. Almost everyone says that they obey all seven commandments. They are far less charitable to "most people." For every one of the commandments, we express only modest confidence in others: We believe that most people don't practice what we preach. The mean scores range from 1.557 for "thou shalt not kill"--hardly an expectation of a peaceful society--to 1.726 for "thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods." We think very highly of our own morality, but give our fellow citizens little credit for holding similar values.
I created factor scores for self and other observance of the commandments. If we condition our moral beliefs on how we expect others to behave, there should be stronger impacts for "others obey commandments." If we decide how to behave primarily on the basis of our own values, then "self obey commandments" should have much stronger effects on moral beliefs. It is easier to disentangle these effects than we might suppose. The simple correlation between the two measures is only .255.
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The commandments measures are designed to tap people's overall commitments to widelyaccepted moral codes (see also Whiteley, in press). They are not surrogates for religious values, nor should they be considered guides to specific behaviors that fall under the commandments. This is why I use an index--and it is pleasing to see that the secular measures fit a one-dimensional factor solution rather well. (Hodgkinson et al., 1996) . Second, even if we put aside theoretical doubts, neither membership nor volunteering has much effect on moral behavior. Both variables had sporadic significant coefficients, but rarely where we would expect them. 9 Two measures of social connectedness that I employ are being married and being a member of a union. Marriage gives you a greater stake in your community. Married people need to consider the needs of others--as well as the moral approbation for violating key norms of society.
I also employ a measure of how important people believe faithfulness is to a successful partnership.
If our experience begins at home and spills over to more general behavior (Newton, 1997) , then attitudes about marital fidelity should have a strong impact on moral behavior. Marital faithfulness is a generalized, though weak, measure of the importance of keeping obligations. Unions also provide a sense of solidarity that should reinforce society's core values among members. 10 I explored other potential indicators of social connectedness such as having children, owning one's own home, and length of time in the community. But none was significant.
I employ three other controls. The first is education. Schools impart socialization of standards of behavior, so highly educated people should be quicker to endorse stronger ethical principles. Also, education is one of the strongest determinants of social trust (Putnam, 1995) . To insure that we don't confound the effects of trust and education, I control for the latter (though the 15 WVS measure is only a trichotomy). Second, people also become more concerned with morality as they get older. Young people with few stakes in the community feel less tied down by moral codes. Age also brings marriage and children. As we grow older, we are more concerned with passing traditional values, even ones that we might not have always accepted, to the next generation. Younger people will thus be less tied to standards of ethical behavior. Table 3 .
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_________________ Trust has big effects on keeping money, buying stolen goods, claiming benefits you are not entitled to, and hitting a car without making a report. This list has two common elements. Three of the four items (with claiming benefits being the exception) involve implicit contracts with strangers (see n. 7). You are not likely to know whose car you hit, who was ripped off in the heist for your stolen goods, or how much the person who lost her wallet will miss it. Your commitment to do the right thing reflects a moral bond and an expectation of reciprocity with people you don't know. Lying, in contrast, involves an acquaintance. Cheating on taxes and avoiding fares (as well as claiming benefits, the exception) revolve around an impersonal government. Interpersonal trust in the United States is a deal among rugged individualists, not a contract with the American government.
The most powerful effects for clear standards of good and evil come on lying in your own interests and keeping money you found. When you lie, you lie to someone. If you find money and a wallet, you also know who your victim is. 14 All of the other items involve cheating a government or some anonymous victim. Opportunities to lie more often arise with people we already know.
We may worry that we will be punished in the hereafter for immoral behavior (note the strong effect for belief in hell). But we are primarily motivated by our moral code: beliefs in our own morality and simple standards of right and wrong.
In contrast, others obey commandments is significant in only two cases: for avoiding fares on public transportation and keeping money that you have found. At first glance, it may seem that people look to others when money is involved. This explanation doesn't hold up: Buying stolen goods, claiming benefits you are not entitled to, and cheating on taxes also involve financial gain.
Yet none has a significant coefficient for others obey commandments. Yet there is a common dimension to the two behaviors. Both might seem to involve moral ambiguities. Not paying fares is a small ticket item. If you believe others will skip paying, you might put aside your own reluctance and commit a "minor" sin. Keeping money you have found might involve small stakes--or you may think that it might be difficult to reach the party who lost the wallet. In either case, you can behave "immorally" without compromising fundamental moral principles. The other six issues either have larger stakes, touch deeper moral codes, or (most likely) both. Note the limited range of expectations of others: They come into play only in highly restricted cases. Even when they do come into play, one's own moral code (self obey commandments) has stronger impacts.
Alienation from the larger society plays a big role in shaping moral behavior. Union membership does produce solidarity on five of the eight items. Union members are more likely to object to claiming benefits you aren't entitled to, to cheat on taxes, to avoid fares on public transportation, and to hit a car without making a report. Three of the four items involve government: Unions tie people to larger institutions. On the other hand, we see no effect at all for education. At least part of the null effects come from the coding of education. A more refined measure would likely show greater effects among the college educated (cf. Putnam, 1995; Uslaner, 1997 Table 2 ). On all seven commandments, we are less charitable toward others: We say that they obey the commandments "to a limited extent." This may well be enough social glue to hold a society together-and to say that we have a sense of shared values-but it is not a sufficient basis for a personal moral code. Instead, we rely upon the clearer signals we get from appraisals of our own behavior.
Trusting and Verifying
Values don't affect all types of behavior equally. Personal morality (self obey commandments) seems most powerful where we are tempted to deceive (lying and cheating on taxes). But it has powerful effects on six of the eight questions. what is the right thing to do makes it "safe" to rely on your own moral code without worrying that others feel differently.
The most powerful effects of moral values and social ties (as determined by the regression coefficients) should occur when there the public is most divided on the questions of moral behavior. To discover whether this is the case, I examine the correlations of the regression coefficients with the mean scores for each type of behavior. 16 The mean score provides a measure of consensus. Here, the lower the score, the more consensus we find. And the regression coefficient is an indicator of the impact of each predictor on moral standards. Given the coding, I expect a negative relationship between the magnitude of the regression coefficient and the mean score. Strongly negative correlations provide support for the thesis that moral values and social ties will matter most when there is less consensus.
And this is what I find. explain. This result could be methodological artifact. But it is not. There is a weak correlation between mean scores and the coefficients for personal morality (-.332). While race ( r = .814) and union membership ( r = -.855) have more powerful effects when there is more dissensus, there is little impact for marriage ( r = -.268) or age ( r = .147). And the effect for others obey commandments vanishes when we drop keeping money you have found. There may be a bias toward stronger impacts when there is more variation to explain, but it is unclear why the effects should be so selective. 19 So it does appear that values are most important when there is less accord on standards of behavior.
There is an additional dynamic to trust in others that distinguishes it from other forms of social capital. Trust matters most when the stakes are highest. It is less important where there are few costs. Joyriding may not impose any financial loss on the injured party. Avoiding fares on public transportation is a small ticket item. Buying stolen goods, keeping money you found, and getting benefits you are not entitled to may produce financial gains. Not making a report on a car you damage may save you increased insurance premiums. I constructed a variable measuring the size of the impact of moral behavior. 20 The "big effects" variable has a correlation of -.931 for the regression coefficients for trust.
Trust has its strongest effects when the stakes are largest and when there is less consensus on what constitutes moral behavior. But there is one more factor that shapes the linkage between trust and moral codes. Trust and expectations of others should matter more when our action has a specific victim. It is easier to make the inferential leap from our life history to prescriptions for current behavior if we can identify in some way with a person (even if he or she is not someone we know-or even if we cannot specifically identify the person). We are more likely to expect 22 reciprocity from a person than from an entity such as government.
The "personal" acts include buying stolen goods, joyriding, keeping money, and hitting a car. In each case, a specific person bears the loss. Even if we cannot identify a particular person, we may feel that we have hurt someone. For the other items--cheating on taxes, claiming benefits, cheating on fares, and (to a lesser extent) lying--we usually can't point to one loser. The correlation between the regression coefficients for trust and the "personal" dummy variable is -.525.
Personal losses correlate at just -.135 with expectations of others. Even if we don't know who might get hurt, knowing that someone in particular might be suffer makes our judgments about correct standards of behavior more dependent upon trust. Yet, such ethical decisions don't depend on our experience with specific others-so it is not surprising that expectations of others' behavior don't matter.
Trust matters most, then, when we need it most: for big ticket items, when there is less consensus on moral behavior, and when our moral behavior deals most directly with other people (rather than an undifferentiated mass). There are fewer clear patterns for generalized moral behavior (self obey commandments, clear standards of good and evil, marital faith). This is as it should be. Strong moral standards don't depend upon context. They shape our expectations of what is acceptable across the board. Only the level of consensus in a society seems to matter for these religious tenets and social ties. And there are only weak patterns for expectations of others' morality-reflecting the weak overall impact for our experiences.
Reciprocity and Values
Standards for moral behavior seem to rest most heavily on our own personal moral codes 23 (self obey commandments, marital faithfulness, and religious beliefs). We crave consistency in our patterns of behavior. A morality based on expectations for others' behavior is very demanding.
We would need to calculate a strategy for behavior for each person we encounter. Most of us don't have the patience to do so. So, depending on our general outlook, we save time, though we take more risks, by employing fewer rules. Most people seem to rely on a simple, straightforward If standards of behavior were entirely driven by self-interest, values wouldn't matter. Nor would generalized trust. For it makes little sense to trust perfect strangers, whose trustworthiness is in doubt and not readily determined (Hardin, 1992 ). Yet, many people do trust strangers and make ethical decisions based upon this "illogical" confidence. If trust depends on knowing whether someone else is trustworthy, the most powerful impact for trust should be found for lying.
Lying is the one activity among the eight where we are likely to know the other party and, hence, have an estimate of his/her trustworthiness. But trust in people is not significant for lying in one's own interest. It matters most when we are not likely to know the other people involved (keeping 24 money found, hitting a car and not making a report, and--perhaps--buying stolen goods)--or at least to know them well. Such calculations involve a generalized ideal of reciprocity that goes well beyond what we find for others obey commandments.
There appears to be a trade-off between one's own adherence to the seven commandments and others'. Where others' behavior is central--on keeping money found and avoiding fares--personal morality is weak. 21 Where self obey commandments is critical--on lying, joyriding, and cheating on taxes--expectations of others' behavior are less important.
Not all ethical arguments are easily resolved. There may be a clash of competing ideals; at other times, as with white lies, we may seek exceptions from general maxims. Even generalized trusters won't apply their moral code all of the time. When the stakes are small, violations from our general code don't seem to matter much. This is why trust, especially to the extent that it is a value, becomes so important on big-ticket moral items. For most aspects of daily life, people get along just fine. (How often are we tempted to joyride? How many of us think of claiming benefits we are not entitled to?) Our moral behavior becomes almost instinctive, with little need to worry about reciprocity. We trust without verifying. As Hume-and later Wilson--argued, the core to the resolution of collective action problems is our moral sense. Uslaner, in press a), and so do others (see Newton, 1997) .
5.
Fifty one percent said that it is never acceptable to lie in one's own interest, 59.3 said one should never hit a car without making a report. Cheating on taxes (65.9) and avoiding a fare on public transport (68 percent) were the only other items that fell below 75 percent for never acceptable. Ninety-one percent believe that others trust them, but just 46 percent of all respondents believe that "most people can be trusted." Even among people who believe that others trust them, just 48.2 percent put their faith in other people. There is, of course, a relationship between social trust and whether you believe that others trust you, but it is far less than we might expect (tau-b = .174, gamma = .627) than we might expect. Trust in others reflects, to a considerable degree, our expectations of trustworthiness. But there is a fairly large residue that suggests something else underlies faith in others as well. And it certainly reflects more than expectations of reciprocity: The correlation of social trust with the self obey commandments factor is just .047.
7.
The gamma between the importance of God in daily life and clear standards of good and evil is .36, about the same as we find for the importance of religion and whether one believes in a personal God. The correlation is within the bounds of other measures of religiosity.
8.
At least part of the reason for the modest correlation is the limited range of the self-obey Commandment variable.
9.
This result provides additional result for my argument, developed elsewhere (Uslaner, in press b) , that the causal direction goes from moral values to volunteering and group membership, and not the other way around (or both ways).
10.
Union membership is a trichotomous variable: Respondent is a member, someone else in the household is a member, and no one is a member.
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11. Seventeen percent of blacks say that "most people can be trusted" compared to 49 percent of whites.
12.
The measures of particularized trust employed in Uslaner (1997) indicate that AfricanAmericans are more likely to be particularized trusters than other races. Details are available on request. An anonymous reviewer suggested that race and union membership might be surrogates for social class and income. I had originally included income in preliminary models, but it was consistently insignficant. The average correlation of income with the measures of moral behavior is .016. For a four-point index of socioeconomic status, the mean correlation is .038. For union membership, the average r is .050, while for race it is .108. Clearly race and union membership are not simply surrogates for income or class. In two Canadian student samples, Laponce (1994) found that Social Democrats attached less importance to the commandments on stealing and lying than did conservatives. I reestimated the equations including the ten-point WVS measure of ideology. Ideology was significant only for lying, not paying fares on public transportation, and hitting a car without making a report. Inclusion of ideology had no impact on the coefficients for race. However, it did effect the coefficients for union membership. The coefficients for claiming benefits and not paying fares became insignificant (though lying and hitting a car remained significant with about the same overall effects).
13.
The sample size is reduced because of listwise deletion of missing data. The moral behavior items are 10 point scales (see Table 1 ). The self-and other-obey commandments 17. The 1981 WVS may lead to some anomalous conclusions. The simple correlations between trust and cheating on taxes (and to a lesser extent avoiding fares) are considerably greater in the 1990 WVS.
18. These findings parallel my results for the relationship between trust in people and participation (Uslaner, 1997) . Trust has bigger effects on nonconsensual forms of participation (where some people do them, others don't) than on consensual modes (where most people either participate or don't). The story is similar on the approbation of moral behavior. These findings make sense if we regard trust as a mixture of values and experience: When we are more divided over ethical standards, we look to both our values and to our expectations of what others will do. We need to trust and to verify.
19.
The effects don't reflect the level of variation in the predictor, either, though it is a likely suspect.
20.
The variable is coded at 1 for buying stolen goods, claiming benefits, keeping money, and hitting a car without making a report. Lying is coded at .5 and the rest at zero.
21.
These comparisons are based on significance levels (see Table 3 ) and t ratios (not shown).
